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In this paper, we reconsider why firms choose to form horizontal alliances when 
launching a new product rather than to undertake such a project on their own. We observe that 
past work on alliance formation has focused on resource complementarity as the main driver for 
inter-firm collaboration and, on this basis, has identified firm characteristics that induce them to 
collaborate. We propose that scale-related motives are also a major driver of alliance formation 
and argue that firms forming scale alliances exhibit different profiles than those forming 
complementary alliances.  
Recent work on alliance formation claims that a firm’s propensity to collaborate results 
from both need and opportunity (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Ahuja, 2000). Indeed, firms 
will consider collaborating when they do not possess the full range of resources required to carry 
out an activity alone; conversely, they will only have opportunities to collaborate provided they 
possess valuable resources that make them attractive to potential partners. In other words, firms 
tend to collaborate when their strengths compensate for a potential partner’s weaknesses while 
their weaknesses are compensated by the partner’s strengths. A typical example is a start-up firm 
having developed a breakthrough innovation teaming up with an established industry incumbent 
possessing strong marketing capabilities (Teece, 1986). This view of alliance formation suggests 
that the main driver of inter-firm collaboration is the complementarity in the resources owned by 
the various partners (Shan, 1990; Mitchell and Singh, 1992). Recent empirical work on alliance 
formation finds indeed that a firm is most likely to form alliances when it is simultaneously 
strong in some resource categories and weak in others (Ahuja, 2000). We claim that this result 
stems from the type of alliances studied in most existing research, i.e. predominantly 
complementary alliances.  
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  We propose that the complementarity view of inter-firm collaboration does not apply to 
all types of alliances. As suggested by prior literature (Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Sakakibara, 
1997; Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell, 2000, 2004), we argue that alliance formation can also 
be motivated by the pursuit of scale benefits. In other words, firms may be led to collaborate not 
so much because they lack one kind of resource altogether but because, regardless of any 
resource type in particular, their overall resource endowment is too limited in quantity for them 
to undertake the considered project on their own. In this perspective, firms do not form alliances 
only to exploit complementary resources but may also decide to collaborate in order to pool 
similar resources. In this view, alliance formation is still motivated by a need, i.e. a lack of 
sufficient critical resources. The opportunity to cooperate however is quite different in nature: it 
stems from the existence of potential partners with similar needs rather than from the availability 
of potential partners with complementary resources.  
Thus, in this paper, we focus on scale alliances and examine the factors that lead a firm to 
undertake a project in collaboration rather than autonomously. This different focus leads us to 
formulate predictions on alliance formation that differ from most previous work which we claim 
has largely overlooked such scale alliances. As argued, in scale alliances, the benefit of 
collaborating is to jointly overcome the common need for critical resources. However, 
collaborating also has a cost (Kogut, 1989; Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989) and, logically, firms 
will engage in alliances only when the benefits of collaboration exceed its cost (Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988; Gulati, 1998). We argue that weaker firms have a greater need than larger ones to 
form scale alliances and will therefore find greater relative benefits in collaboration. Indeed, 
firms with limited resource endowments will often be faced with the dilemma of either 
collaborating or not undertaking the project altogether. Stronger firms will generally have the 
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option of carrying out the project on their own and have little incentive to incur the cost 
associated with collaboration. As a consequence, we predict that the firms most likely to form 
scale alliances are weaker firms. 
 
BACKGROUND  
Early theoretical work on alliance formation suggested that two main motivations lead 
firms to enter into alliances within their industry: (i) increasing efficiency and/or market power, 
and (ii) exploiting asset complementarity and/or acquiring new capabilities (Mariti and Smiley, 
1983; Ghemawat, Porter and Rawlinson, 1986; Porter and Fuller, 1986; Kogut, 1988; Hennart, 
1988; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991). These motivations are necessary drivers of alliance 
formation but could be achieved through other means (market transactions or industry 
consolidation). Transaction cost arguments have thus been introduced to justify when alliances 
become the preferred option (Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988).  
Early empirical studies tried to discriminate between the two above mentioned 
motivations. Results showing that larger firms had a greater propensity to form alliances 
provided support for a market power argument (Berg and Friedman, 1978) while the observation 
that firms forming alliances operated in slightly different industry segments supported the 
complementarity / capability acquisition rationale (Berg and Friedman, 1981). 
More recently, numerous empirical studies have examined how these motivations are 
related to both industry-level (Ghemawat, Porter and Rawlinson, 1986; Harrigan,1988; Nohria 
and Garcia-Pont, 1991;  Burgers, Hill and Kim, 1993; Gulati, 1998) and firm-level factors 
conducive to the formation of alliances. Studies on firm-level factors have focused on the 
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following characteristics of those firms likely to have the highest propensity to form alliances: 
firm size, competitive position, product portfolio and resource endowment (Shan, 1990; Mitchell 
and Singh, 1992; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Ahuja, 2000). 
Shan (1990) examined firm-level determinants that lead high technology start-up firms to 
team up with established companies to commercialize an innovation rather than to go to market 
alone. The results of this study show that smaller firms and industry followers are more likely to 
collaborate, while larger competitors and technology leaders tend to favor independent market 
entry. This suggests that the main driver of alliance formation is an insufficient stock of critical 
resources. All the firms examined in this study are high-tech start-ups that provide their 
established partner with a valuable innovation, thus creating new business opportunities for this 
partner. 
Mitchell and Singh (1992) focused on the other party in alliances, i.e. industry incumbents 
that choose to collaborate with innovators to expand into a new technical domain. Their results 
demonstrate that stronger competitors are more prone than weaker players to form pre-entry 
alliances, suggesting that more attractive partners are presented with more alliance opportunities 
and can therefore more easily enter into promising partnership agreements. This appears to 
contradict Shan’s (1990) conclusions. However, Mitchell and Singh (1992) also found, like Shan 
(1990), that latecomers into the new domain are more likely to collaborate. This suggests that 
alliance formation is induced by both a need, as argued previously by Shan (1990), and 
opportunities stemming from a firm’s attractiveness as a potential partner.  
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) have explicitly built on this view, claiming that 
alliance formation is driven by both strategic needs and social opportunities. In a study on 
entrepreneurial semiconductor firms, they have shown that firms tend to enter alliance 
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agreements when they are in a vulnerable strategic position, either because they are competing in 
emergent or highly competitive industries or because they are pursuing pioneering technical 
strategies, which the authors interpret as denoting a strategic need. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
(1996) also found that the studied firms were more likely to collaborate when they were in 
“strong social positions”, i.e led by large, experienced and well-connected top management 
teams, which they interpret as creating greater opportunities for collaboration.  
The above mentioned studies examine alliances formed by small innovative firms with 
established industry incumbents. Such an endeavor creates a high degree of complementarity 
between potential partners, suggesting in turn that this complementarity is the primary driver of 
alliance formation (Teece, 1986). The general conclusion of these studies is twofold: those small 
innovating start-ups most likely to collaborate are the weaker or more vulnerable firms; in 
contrast, those industry incumbents most likely to cooperate with such start-ups are the stronger 
competitors. Indeed, all start-ups are potentially attractive partners because of the innovation they 
can contribute to the alliance; those most likely to cooperate are the firms that are the least able to 
exploit their innovation on their own. Conversely, most established incumbents seek innovations 
with which to expand their business, those most likely to cooperate are those in a position to 
cherry-pick and exploit the most promising innovations thanks to their manufacturing and 
commercial capabilities.  
Ahuja (2000) extended the same line of reasoning to alliance formation among leading 
incumbents in a mature industry. Consistent with the above argument, he found that industry 
incumbents with the highest propensity to collaborate are those that have greater technical or 
commercial capital. Based on the argument that alliance formation is driven by both inducements 
and opportunities, he also found that simultaneous ownership of strong technical and commercial 
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capital reduced a firm’s propensity to collaborate. In other words, firms most likely to collaborate 
are those that are strong in some resource categories and seek a complement in some other 
resource category. Again, Ahuja (2000) finds that opportunities to collaborate are a function of 
the firms’ attractiveness and that collaboration is induced by some resource need.  
In sum, all these studies on firm level factors driving alliance formation have in fact 
focused on complementary (link) alliances. However, as mentioned earlier, theories on 
motivations for alliance formation argue that access to complementary resources is only one of 
two possible alliance motivations (e.g. Hennart, 1988). Empirical work on alliance activity in 
various industries bears this distinction by showing that both scale and link alliances co-exist in 
most industry settings, are formed by firms pertaining to different strategic groups and lead to 
contrasted outcomes (Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991; Dussauge et al., 2000, 2004). Little is 
known, however, on the firm-level factors that drive firms to form scale alliances. While one of 
the main findings of studies on complementary alliances is that those industry incumbents most 
likely to collaborate are the leading competitors in the industry, we argue that focusing on scale 
alliances leads to opposite predictions: those industry incumbents most likely to form scale 
alliances are competitors in a weaker position. 
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Following Hennart (1988), we use the scale-link typology of alliances. This typology 
categorizes alliances according to the partners’ contributions to the joint activity. Scale alliances, 
in which partners contribute similar resources for the same stages in the value-chain, aim at 
producing economies of scale for those activities that firms carry out in collaboration. Link 
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alliances, in contrast, aim at combining different skills and resources from each partner. Link 
alliances include partnerships in which one partner provides market access to products or 
technologies that the other firm has developed. Scale alliances primarily produce efficiency gains 
by pooling similar assets from the partners, carrying out business activities in which both firms 
have experience.  
The classical resource-based approach (Penrose, 1959) suggests that a firm’s resource 
endowment determines its growth. Indeed, according to Penrose (1959), most resources are 
fungible, that is, they can be redeployed to additional uses, other than the current one. The same 
argument has been applied to more intangible competences (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990; Teece, 
Pisano and Shuen, 1997: 529).  
Building on this resource-based view of firm growth, we propose that scale alliances are 
formed primarily within the partner firms’ core business, while link alliances are formed to 
pursue expansion opportunities at the frontiers of the partner firms’ current businesses. 
Combining different resources through link alliances is unnecessary in business areas where 
firms are already active because, by definition, such firms possess all the categories of discrete 
resources needed to operate. Combining different resources may in contrast create innovation 
opportunities (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995) that allow the partner firms to extend the limits of 
their existing business, either by entering adjacent product-market areas or by substituting 
existing products and technologies with innovative ones. On the contrary, pooling greater 
quantities of similar resources in scale alliances favors growth within the boundaries of the core 
business by enhancing efficiency on current product lines or by mobilizing sufficient resources to 
fuel the ongoing renewal of product lines.  Innovation in scale alliances is not radically different 
from what each partner would have achieved on its own, had it had sufficient resources.  In 
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contrast, innovation in link alliances stems from the combination of different resources 
contributed respectively by each partner and could not be achieved by any partner on its own: 
such innovation is likely to take place outside the scope of the core business of either partner. 
Indeed, most empirical research on alliances, which we argued focuses on link alliances, 
conceptualizes these alliances as mechanisms to take advantage of business opportunities that 
would have been outside the reach of each partner on its own: Mitchell and Singh (1992) 
examine how alliances between incumbents and innovators allow entry into new technical sub-
fields of the industry; Shan (1990), as well as Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996), study how 
start-ups and established competitors collaborate in order to market new technologies. The few 
studies that explicitly consider scale alliances (Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991; Dussauge and 
Garrette, 1995; Dussauge et al., 2000, 2004) show that such alliances are formed by direct 
competitors exhibiting similar features (size, geographic origin, etc.), all facing similar issues, 
which choose to collaborate in order to maintain or enhance their position in their core business.  
Because of these distinctive resource features of scale and link alliances, the decision to 
form one or the other type of alliance is an alternative to radically different baseline strategies. 
Scale alliances are essentially an alternative to autonomous production in the firm’s core 
business. Link alliances in contrast are formed primarily to pursue new business developments 
that would be left aside if no partnering opportunities were available. In other words, in scale 
alliances, partnering firms face the choice of collaborating or going it alone; in link alliances, 
partnering firms face the choice of collaborating or forgoing a new business opportunity.  
In a context where it might consider forming a scale alliance, a firm possessing resources 
(assumed here to be fungible) in sufficient quantities is more likely to choose autonomous 
production over collaboration because of the financial, organizational and strategic cost of 
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cooperating with a competitor (e.g. Hamel, 1991). If on the contrary, the focal firm lacks 
sufficient resources and rejects collaboration, it will be forced to give up the considered 
investment altogether and therefore compromise growth or even ongoing presence in entire areas 
of its core business, the only other choice being to merge.   
In contrast, in a position where firms might consider forming a link alliance, most of them 
will not have the option of pursuing the same new business opportunity on their own, at least in 
the short run. In such a context, a firm can choose not to form the alliance and not to implement 
the considered project, without jeopardizing its position or growth in its core business. In this 
case, taking advantage of such a business opportunity alone will require the acquisition of 
different resources, and therefore lead to either long term investments to develop such resources 
internally or to the acquisition of an existing firm that possesses the needed resources. Overall, 
scale alliances are primarily defensive in nature while link alliances support more offensive 
strategies. It can be noted here that scale and link alliances are not substitutes for one another. In 
other words, a firm is almost never confronted with the choice of forming either a scale or a link 
alliance. Instead, firms face one of the following two choices: (i) forming a scale alliance or 
producing autonomously, or (ii) forming a link alliance or not engaging in the considered project. 
Given the differences between scale and link alliances outlined above, it is unlikely that 
those factors leading firms to form link alliances will also motivate the formation of scale 
alliances. As most past research on alliance formation has implicitly focused on link alliances, 
their conclusions may not be generalizable to all alliance types. Research focusing specifically on 
the formation of scale alliances would contribute to a broader understanding of collaboration as 
an alternative to other strategic and organizational choices. In addition, most existing research 
has examined the propensity of firms to collaborate, and has thus compared collaboration to non 
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collaboration, which implicitly includes both producing alone and not engaging in the considered 
project. Our focus on scale alliances leads us to contrast firms choosing to collaborate with firms 
choosing to produce autonomously.  
In scale alliances, the very co-existence of similar needs in multiple industry incumbents 
creates the opportunity for collaboration. Indeed, if several firms are simultaneously limited in 
their growth by a constrained stock of resources, they have a mutual incentive to pool their 
resources in order to undertake activities jointly. While the benefits of scale advantages can 
theoretically accrue to all industry incumbents, the costs of collaboration create a disincentive to 
collaborate. Collaboration costs include coordination costs, the risks associated with mutual 
dependence as well as a competitive risk (Hamel, 1991). Only those firms that most need 
additional stocks of a given resource contributed by other partners will engage in scale alliances. 
Stronger competitors have the option to produce on their own. Moreover, stronger firms will be 
reluctant to enter into scale alliances because the costs and risks involved will more than 
outweigh the expected benefits. Hence, the following proposition:  
Scale alliances are predominantly formed by weaker competitors seeking to maintain or 
enhance their position in their core business. 
 
EVIDENCE FROM AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION 
To provide empirical support for the above proposition, we examined new product 
development project launches in the aircraft industry worldwide between 1949 and 2000. We 
studied 334 new aircraft projects undertaken either through alliances or on a single-firm basis by 
all 130 major aircraft manufacturers in the Western hemisphere. In this industry, we considered 
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as horizontal alliances those projects that were carried out by several firms sharing the prime 
contracting responsibility. In contrast to collaborative projects, we defined as autonomous 
projects those projects that were implemented under the authority of a single prime contractor. 
This definition of autonomous production does not preclude outsourcing large parts of the project 
to suppliers, including through vertical partnerships.  
Sharing the prime contracting responsibility in aircraft production results in the formation 
of scale alliances since all prime contracting partners contribute resources in all major functional 
areas: R&D, manufacturing, marketing and sales. Because the industry is characterized by 
considerable and ever increasing economies of scale (Hartley, 1991), new aircraft projects 
require the mobilization of substantial resources that may be beyond the reach of any individual 
company even when the company in question has produced similar products in the past (Hartley 
and Martin, 1990; Dussauge and Garrette, 1995). The resources required to launch a new project 
include both tangible and intangible resources such as R&D facilities and capabilities, 
manufacturing assets, and access to large enough markets.  
As expected, we find that aircraft manufacturers are more likely to form scale alliances 
rather than to autonomously undertake a new aircraft project when: 
⎯  They are small relative to their industry peers, 
⎯  They have access to a smaller market base, and 
⎯  Their experience in the considered product category is more limited. 
These results support the idea according to which scale alliances are primarily formed by weaker 
competitors.  
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CONCLUSION 
  Overall, the extant literature on link alliances and our results on scale alliances suggest 
that scale and link alliances exhibit more radical differences that usually thought. They differ in 
their motivations: scale alliances are formed to pool resources that all partners possess but in 
quantities too limited to achieve their goals; link alliances are formed to complement one 
partner’s set of resources with a different set of resources possessed by the other partner. Firms 
enter into scale alliances in order to maintain or grow their position in their core business while 
they form link alliances to seize new business opportunities. Because of this, scale and link 
alliances are alternatives to contrasted baseline strategies: scale alliances are essentially an 
alternative to autonomous production, while link alliances are an alternative to forgoing the 
considered new business opportunity altogether. Scale alliances are formed primarily for 
defensive purposes while link alliances support expansion strategies. Logically, scale alliances 
are formed by firms in a weaker and more vulnerable position while those firms best positioned 
to take advantage of opportunities afforded by link alliances are the dominant competitors in the 
industry. Finally, as shown in prior work, scale and link alliances raise different management 
issues, create different levels of risk and lead to contrasted outcomes (Dussauge et al., 2000; 
2004). Indeed, scale alliances primarily raise efficiency issues while link alliances create mutual 
dependence between the partners and can result in potentially damaging inter-partner learning 
(Hamel, 1991).  
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